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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Bryann Kristine Lemmons (Lemmons) was charged in Twin Falls County Case
No.CR-2011-0014836 on or about May 29, 2011, with two counts of Trafficking in
Methamphetamine, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-204. (R. pp. 16-18.)
Lemmons was also charged in Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2012-0010131 on or
about September 7, 20 I 2, with two counts of Conspiracy to Traffic in Methamphetamine,
Felony, I.C. §§ 37-2732b(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-1701. (R., pp. 567-570.) It should
be noted that these two separate cases stemmed from the same alleged acts contained in
the Affidavit of Probable Cause in Support of Criminal Complaint/Citation. (R. pp. I 927, 571-579.)
The two above-cited cases were consolidated and a jury trial was conducted on or
about May 29-30, 20 I 3, before the Honorable Randy J. Stoker. A jury verdict was
returned on or about May 30, 2013, which found Lemmons to be guilty on all four (4)
counts. The jury verdict included a statement that Lemmons represented that the
methamphetamine weighed 28 grams or more. ( R. pp. 380-381, 810-811.) That
sentencing was scheduled for July 29, 20 I 3, and a Pre-Sentence Investigation, Mental
Health Examination and Substance Abuse Evaluation were ordered by the Court. (R. pp.
379. 401, 818-819, 823.)
Lemmons filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New
Trial on or about June 13, 2013. (R. pp. 416-418, 838-840.) The State filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of i\cquittal and
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Motion for New Trial, as well as a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, on or
about June 24, 2013, and July 10, 2013, respectively. (R. pp. 422-444, 842-865.)
Lemmons filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Renewed Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal and/or Motion for New Trial on or about July 12, 2013, (R. pp.
445-450, 866-871 ), as well as a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on or about July 15, 2013. (R. pp. 454-458,
875-879.) That a hearing was conducted relative to Lemmons' Renewed Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial on or about July 15, 2013, and the Court
issued an Order Granting Motion for New Trial in Part, Denying Motion for New Trial in
Part, and Denying Motion for Acquittal. (R. pp. 452-453, 873-874.) The matter was then
rescheduled for pretrial conference and jury trial. (R. p. 459, 880.) The State filed a
Notice of Appeal relative to the Court's Order Granting Motion for New Trial in Part,
Denying Motion for New Trial in Part, and Denying Motion for Acquittal on or about
July 24, 2013. (R. pp. 464-467, 885-888.)
Lemmons timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support
Thereof on or about July 25, 2013, (R. pp. 468-478, 889-899). Lemmons filed a Motion
for Pennissive Appeal and Memorandum in Support Thereof on or about July 29, 2013.
(R. pp. 481-491, 902-912.) The State filed a Memorandum Opposing Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 15, 2013. (R. pp. 506-513, 927-934.) On
or about August 22, 2013, Lemmons filed a Final Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Renewed Jud 6rment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial and Dismissal.
(R. pp. 514-531, 935-952.) That a hearing relative to Lemmons' Motion for

'

Reconsideration was conducted on or about August 23, 2013, and the Court entered an
Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 26, 2013. (R. pp.
533-534, 954-955.) In the Court's Order, Lemmons \Vas h1fanted an acquittal on all four
(4) counts of criminal conduct set forth in their respective Information( s ). however,
Lemmons remained convicted of the charges of Delivery, on the theory of a lesser
included offense. (R. pp. 533-534, 954-955.) Lemmons timely filed a Notice of CrossAppeal relative to Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2011-14836 on or about October 4,
2013. (R. pp. 538-541).

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
entered by the Honorable Randy J. Stoker on or about August 26, 2013, finding that
Defendant's Motion for Acquittal as a matter oflaw as to Conspiracy to Tratlic in
Methamphetamine and the enhancement on each delivery charge (trafficking) is granted
and Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Acquittal as to Delivering Methamphctaminc is
denied. [emphasis added.] Lemmons appeals the denial of her request for acquittal and/or
new trial as to the two counts of Delivery, only.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a trial by jury, Lemmons was convicted of four (4) counts of criminal
conduct. (R. pp. 380-381, 810-811.) Lemmons made a Motion fr)r Judgment of
Acquittal after the conclusion of the State's presentation of evidence, which was denied
by the Court. (Trial Tr. p. 352, Ll. 11-12.) Lemmons filed a Renewed Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal attcr the return of the jury verdict which was granted in part and
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denied in part. (R. pp. 452-453, 873-874.) Finally, Lemmons filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which ultimately led to the Court entering an acquittal as to the four (4)
counts of criminal conduct contained in the lnformation(s). (R. pp. 533-534, 954-955.)
Because the Court considered the crime of Trafficking to be Delivery with an
enhancement, the Court determined that Lemmons would remain convicted of the lesser
included offenses of Delivery. (Trial Tr. pp. 382-383, Reconsideration Tr. p. 37.)
The District Court based its decision to acquit on the fact that the State had failed
to introduce evidence that one ounce was equal to or greater than 28 grams.
(Reconsideration Tr. p. 37.) The only evidence introduced by the State in this regard was
a statement of the Detective that one ounce was "approximately" 28 grams. (Trial Tr. p.
342, I. 4.)
Lemmons also requested a Ninth Circuit jury instruction relating to the credibility
of informants. The District Court denied Lemmons' request on the basis that Idaho case
law did not speak to that issue. (Trial Tr. pp. 384-385.)
Both the State and Lemmons appealed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(a) Whether or not the Court erred in failing to grant Lemmons' Motion
for New Trial or Acquittal as to two (2) Counts of Delivery of
Methamphetamines; and
(b) Whether or not Lemmons' Constitutional rights were violated by the
Court's jury instructions and/or failure to include jury instructions.
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ARGUMENT

Lemmons was charged with two counts of Trafficking in Methamphetamine. I.C.
§§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-204, in Twin Falls County Case No. CR-20110014836. (R. pp. 16-18.) Lemmons was also charged in Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-2012-0010131, with two counts of Conspiracy to Traffic in Methamphetamine,
Felony, LC.§§ 37-2732b(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-1701. (R., pp. 567-570.) Both
criminal cases were consolidated for the purposes of trial, therefore, the charges at issue
in the trial total four (4) counts of criminal conduct as set forth in their respective
Information( s ).
At trial in this matter, counsel for Lemmons made a Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal after the conclusion of the presentation of the State's case. (Trial Tr. p. 352, LI.
11-12.) Counsel for Lemmons argued that the State could not meet one or more of the
elements of the four (4) charges against Lemmons and, therefore, should be !:,'Tanted an
acquittal. (Trial Tr. p. 355, LI. 9-12.) The Court denied Lemmons' Motion at that time.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four (4)
counts of criminal conduct. Lemmons filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
and Motion for New Trial on or about June 13, 2013. (R. pp. 416-418. 838-840.) Alter
hearing on the Renewed Motion, the Court granted Lemmons request for a new trial in its
Order Granting Motion for New Trial in Part, Denying Motion for New Trial in Part, and
Denying Motion for Acquittal. (R. pp. 452-453, 873-874.) Lemmons filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support Thereof on or about July 25. 2013. (R. pp.
468-478, 889-899.) The Court entered an Order on or about August 26. 2013. finding
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that Defendant's Motion for Acquittal as a matter of law as to Conspiracy to Traffic in
Methamphetamine and the enhancement on each delivery charge (trafficking) is granted
and Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Acquittal as to Delivering Methamphetamine is
denied. [emphasis added.]
The Order on Lemmons' Motion for Reconsideration is somewhat confusing in
that the District Court treated the charge of Trat1icking as an "enhancement" to the charge
of Delivery. (Trial Tr. pp. 382-383.) While it may not be clear on its face, that Order
effectively resulted in an acquittal of all four counts of criminal conduct set forth in their
respective lnforrnation(s). However, given that the District Court treated the charge of
Tratficking as Delivery with an enhancement, the District Court dctennined that
Lemmons would remain convicted of two counts of Delivery of Methamphetamines, even
though those charges were not contained in either of the Inforrnation(s).
Lemmons appeals only that part of the Order on Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration wherein Lemmons was denied an acquittal and/or new trial as to the two
counts of Delivery, only. Lemmons specifically did not appeal that part of the Order
which relates to acquittal of the charges contained in Twin Falls County Case No. CR2012-001013.

The District Court erred in failing to grant Lemmons' Motion for
New Trial or Acquittal as to two (2) Counts of Deliverv of
Mcthamphetamines
\Vhile Lemmons appreciates the State's tenacity by insisting that the District
Court was wrong in finding "insutlicient evidence to convict" Lemmons in the principal
case, the fact that the District Court may or may not have been wrong is irrelevant. The
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reason for this lies in the reading of Evans v. Michigan, 13 3 S. Ct. 1069 (2013 ), a case that
is, quite frankly, overwhelming relevant because of its extraordinarily direct application
to the issues in the principal case. The case is recent. (February 20, 2013), relevant
(involves the same issues as the principal case), and specifically abrogates the Idaho
Supreme Court case of State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003).
So, while the State insists that the jury could have concluded that an ounce of
methamphetamines was more than 28 grams, the following citations show conclusively
that whether they could or not, is absolutely and categorically irrelevant.
Consider the following:
[O]ur cases have applied Fong Foo's principle broadly. An acquittal is
unreviewable whether a judge directs a jury to return a verdict of acquittal,
e.g., Fong Foo, 369 U.S., at 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, or forgoes that formality by
entering a judgment of acquittal herself. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543
U.S. 462, 467-468, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 914 (2005) (collecting
cases). And an acquittal precludes retrial even i/'it is premised upon an
erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. l/nited States, 437
U.S. 54, 68-69, 78, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 ( 1978): a mistaken
understanding a/what evidence ,muld suffice to sustain a conviction,
Smith, 543 U.S., at 473, 125 S.Ct. 1129; or a ''misconstruction of'the
statute" defining the requirements to convict, Rumsey, 46 7 U.S. at 203,
211 104 S.Ct. 2305; cf Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-145, n.
7, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986). In all these circumstances, "the
fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or
erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles affects the accuracy
of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character." United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 ( 1978)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
[emphasis added.]

[O]ur cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the
prosecution's proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an
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offense. See ibid., and n. 11; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10, 98
S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supp~v
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571. 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). Thus an
"acquittal" includes "a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient
to convict," a "factual finding [that] necessarily establish[es] the criminal
defendant's lack of criminal culpability," and any other "rulin[g] which
relate[s] to the ultimate question of guilty or innocense." Scott, 437 U.S.,
at 91, 98, and n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
These sorts of substantive rulings stand apart from procedural rulings that
may also terminate a case midtrial, which we generally refer to as
dismissals or mistrials. Procedural dismissals include rulings on questions
that "arc unrelated to factual guilty or innoccnsc." but "which serve other
purposes," including "a legal judgment that a defendant, although
criminally culpable, may not be punished" because of some problem like
an error with the indictment. Id., at 98, and n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2187.
Both procedural dismissal and substantive rulings result in an early end to
trial, but we explained in Scott that double jeopardy consequences of each
differ. ''[T]he law attaches particular significance to an acquittal," so a
merits-related ruling concludes proceedings absolutely. id., at 91. 98 S.Ct.
2187. This is because "[t]o permit a second trial after an acquittal,
however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an
unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior
resources, might wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent
he may be found t,lllilty,"' ibid. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)). And retrial following an
acquittal would upset a defendant's expectation of repose, for it would
subject him to additional ''embarrassment, expense and ordeal" while
"compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity."
id., at 187, 78 S.Ct. 221. In contrast, a "termination of the proceedings
against [a defendant] on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocem:c of
the offense of which he is accused," 437 U.S., at 98-99 S.Ct. 2187, i.e ..
some procedural brround. docs not pose the same concerns, because no
expectation of finality attaches to a properly granted mistrial.

"[l]t is plain that the [trial court] ... ernluatcd the [State's] evidence and
determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction." ,Hartin
Linen, 430 U.S., at 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349. The trial court granted Evan's
motion under a rule that requires the court to "direct a verdict of acquittal
on any charged offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support
conviction." ,Hich. Rule Crim. Proc .. 6.4 l 9(A) (2012). And the court's
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oral ruling leaves no doubt that it made its determination on the basis of
"'[t]he testimony'" that the State had presented. 491 Mich., at 8,810
N.W.2d,m at 539. This ruling was not a dismissal on a procedural ground
"unrelated to factual guilty or innocence," like the question of
"preindictment delay" in Scalf, but rather a detennination that the State
had failed to prove its case. 437 U.S., at 98, 99, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Under our
precedents, then, Evans was acquitted.
There is no question the trial court's ruling was wrong; it was predicated
upon a clear misunderstanding of what facts the State needed to prove
under State law. But that is of no moment. Martin Linen, Sanabria,
Rumsey, Smalis, and Smith all instruct that an acquittal due to insufficient
evidence precludes retrial, whether the court's evaluation of the evidence
is "correct or not," Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, and
regardless of'whether the court's decision.flowedFom an incorrect
antecedent ruling oflmv. Here Evans' acquittal was the product of an
"erroneous interpretatio[ n] of governing legal principals," but as in our
other cases, that error affects only "the accuracy of [the] determination" to
acquit, not "its essential character." Scott, 437 U.S., at 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[emphasis added]
And, evidently it doesn't matter what label is used by the District Court, as
indicated by the Court in Evans as follows:
Our decision turns not on the form of the trial court's action, but rather
whether it "serve[ s]" substantive "purposes" or procedural ones. Scott,
437 U.S., at 98, n. 11, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Ifa trial court were to announce,
rnidtrial, "The defendant shall be acquitted because he was prejudiced by
preindictment delay," the Double Jeopardy Clause would pose no barrier
to reprosecution, notwithstanding the "acquittal" label. Cf. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65. Here we know the trial court acquitted
Evans, not because it incanted the word "acquit" (which it did not), but
because it acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove its
case.
In view of the recent Evans case (February, 2013), and its specific abrogating of

State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), Lemmons was entitled to an acquittal
when the District Court ruled that the State's evidence was legally insutlicient to sustain a
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conviction. And, accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar a retrial for the
same offense. A Jud 6'1.11ent of Acquittal should have issued.
The District Court specifically declined to take judicial notice of the number of
grams in an ounce (Trial Tr. p. 34 7, LL 9-11 ), and the law is clear that facts not
traditionally cognizable must be proved. Holtz v. Babcock, 143 Mont. 371, 390 P.2d 801,

Leahy v. Department of Revenue, 266 Mont. 94, 879 P .2d 653 ( 1994). The State at trial
merely made a verbal representation that one ounce was equal to 28.35 grams, (Trial Tr.
p. 346, LL 24-25, p. 347, Ll. 1-19) but never presented evidence to that effect.
The only evidence presented at trial relative to the conversion of ounces to grams
was a statement of Officer Sweezy who, in responding to the question, "how many grams
are there in an ounce?" stated there were "approximately 28." (Trial Tr. p. 342, 1. 4.)
There simply was no other evidence offered regarding the number of grams of drugs
involved in this case.
The question of whether the District Court's refusal to take judicial notice of the
grams-to-ounces conversion tables was erroneous, i.e., was right or wrong, is irrelevant.
According to Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. l 069(2013), the only question in this regard
is whether or not the District Court's acquittal was procedural or substantive. It is obvious
from a reading of the transcript that the District Court determined that there was
insufficient evidence to convict on all four counts. (Reconsideration Tr. p. 35, LL 2-7.)
As such, according to Evans. the District Court made a ··merits" based or substantive
ruling. The holding of the Evans Court is as follows:

"f w]e hold that Evans' trial ended

in an acquittal when the trial court ruled the state had failed to produce sufficient
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evidence of his guilt. The Double Jeopardy Clause thus bars retrial for his offense and
should have barred the state's appeal." Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013).
Lemmons believes that the law is clear in that the question of whether or not the Court
wrongfully or rightfully took judicial notice is irrelevant in this proceeding. The only
question in this regard is whether or not the acquittal was substantive or procedural.
Should this Court find that the acquittal was substantive or "merits" based, there need not
be any further discussion about the District Court's decision as the State should be barred
from their appeal as set forth in Evans. However, in an exercise in futility, Lemmons sets
forth the following case law in support of the District Court granting an acquittal.
The Court did what it did and thereby set the standard regarding which party had
what burden of proof and, more importantly, what evidence had to be produced to convict
Lemmons. In other words, right or wrong, the rules were laid down by the Court, and in
order for the jury to convict Lemmons, the State had to prove that there was 28.35 grams
in an ounce. All that was proven by the State was that there were "approximately" 28
grams in an ounce, which is not sufficient to support a conviction because the State did
not prove a major clement of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. "28 grams or more"
would be beyond a reasonable doubt. Approximately 28 grams is not. And, certainly the
State's representation to the jury in his closing argument that the Officer had testified that
there were "more than 28 grams in an ounce", is not only erroneous, but improper, and
creates an impermissible influence on the jury requiring an acquittal andior new trial.
(Trial Tr. p. 41 L Ll. 6-8.)
It should be noted that the law in most jurisdictions follows the rule that it is

- 12 -

discretionary with the Trial Court whether it will take judicial notice of well-established
patterns of fact, usually depending upon the nature of the subject matter, the issue
involved, the apparent justice, and the circumstances of the particular case. Brough v.

UteStampedeAss'n., 105 Utah 446,142 P.2d670(1943).
The test of whether a court will take judicial notice of a fact is whether sufficient
notoriety will attach to the fact, and if there is any doubt either as to the fact itself or as to
it being a matter of common knowledge, evidence will be required. Ecco High

Frequency Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 81 N.Y.S.2d. 610 (1948).
Therefore, by the jury in this case convicting Lemmons, the jury must have
considered infonnation that was not properly presented at trial, i.e., pursuant to the Idaho
Rules of Evidence.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (b) provides that a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either ( l) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. "A court must take
judicial notice ifrequested by a party and supplied with the necessary information."

Idaho Rule a/Evidence 20f(b), Nev,:man v. State, 149 Idaho 225,227 (Ct.App. 2010). As
further evidence that the conversion of an ounce into grams is not well known or
universally accepted, the State of Idaho, introduced evidence, at hearing, on the Renewed
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal asking the Court to take judicial notice of a packet of
"Tic Tacs". Counsel for Lemmons pointed out that the "Tic Tacs" identify that the
contents weigh one ounce, however. on the label of said "Tic Tacs", it claims that the
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conversion of one ounce is 29 grams, which we all know to be incorrect. (Trial Tr. p.
460, Ll. 4-16.)
In the instant case, the District Court denied the State's request to take judicial
notice of the conversion of one ounce into grams. As such, it can only be assumed that
the information that is sought to be taken notice of is information that is not generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and/or was not capable of accurate
and ready determination. Further, documents generally should be placed into evidence
through ordinary avenues. Ne,nnan v. State, 149 Idaho 225, 227 ( Ct.App. 20 I 0). This is
done by laying an appropriate foundation to demonstrate the documents authenticity and
relevance. (See Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 and 902.) The State failed to introduce any
evidence in support of their requested judicial notice.
Of course, the above discussion of the judicial notice issue is probably irrelevant
because of the Evans Court's position that an acquittal due to insufficient evidence
precludes retrial "regardless of whether the Court's decision flowed from an incorrect
antecedent ruling of law." Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1076 (2013).
Therefore, for all of the reasons set forth above, it appears more than obvious that
Lemmons is entitled to an acquittal of the charge(s) contained in the respective
In formation( s ).

The Court erred in failing to grant an acquittal to Lemmons on two
counts of Delivery of Methamphetamines.
Lemmons' position with regards to the charge(s) of Deli\cry is that they should
have been, and still should be. dismissed by the Court. Lemmons first request is that she
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be granted an acquittal on the charges of Delivery. In the alternative, Lemmons requests
that she be granted a new trial. While Lemmons alternative request for relief is a new
trial on the charges of Delivery, Lemmons asserts that should the Court vacate the
conviction and wish to reset a trial, that in reality, by vacating the conviction, Lemmons is
actually 1:,:rranted an acquittal by virtue of Idaho Code Section 19-1719, which states as
follows:
19-1719. CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL BARS INCLUDED
OFFENSES. When the defendant is convicted or acquitted, or has once
been placed in jeopardy upon an indictment, the conviction, acquittal or
jeopardy is a bar to another indictment for the offense charged in the
former, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense included
therein, of which he might have been convicted under that indictment.
It is clear from the record that Lemmons made a Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal at the conclusion of the presentation of the State's evidence. It is also clear that
Lemmons renewed her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal following the jury's verdict of
guilt. As such, Lemmons' Motion should clearly have been granted when it was first
made during trial. Had the District Court made the "proper" decision during trial,
Lemmons would have been granted an acquittal at that time thereby preventing any
discussion of jury instructions or lesser included offenses.
In the alternative, Lemmons seeks a new trial as to the two counts of Delivery on
the basis that the District Court failed to grant Lemmons her requested jury instruction
relating to the credibility of the informant(s).

Lemmons' Constitutional rights were violated by the Court's jury
instructions and/or failure to include jury instructions.
First of all. the District Court in trying the case refused to give a requested
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informant instruction based on the fact that Idaho State law did not require same, despite
Ninth Circuit law requiring such an instruction if requested.
It is clear that under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. Vl,
cl. 2, federal legislation enacted pursuant to constitutionally derived federal authority
trumps a conflicting state law, even if the state law furthers a court police power interest.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). "(The
Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal
and state law, federal law shall prevail").
However, in the principal case, there actually isn't any conflicting law involved.
There just isn't any state law requiring such an instruction. Based upon that fact, i.e., the
absence of state law, the Court in this case refused to follow Ninth Circuit law and give
the requested instruction. It is Lemmons' position that said refusal violated Lemmons'
rights to due process. Consider the following cases.
In US v. Monzon-Valenzuela, 186 F.3d 1181 (9 th Cir. 1999) "the informant
instruction applies only to witnesses "who provide evidence against a defendant for some
personal advantage or vindication, as well as for pay or immunity."
In US. v. Cuellar, 96 F.3d 1179 (9 th Cir. 1996). The defendant in this case argued
that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for outrageous
government conduct because Garavito \Vas paid a .. contingent" fee that was dependant
upon the amount of drugs involved and upon whether Cuellar was convicted. In his
argument he pointed out that the Fifth Circuit held that an infonnant paid a contingent fee
is not a competent witness and that a conviction based on said testimony must be
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reversed. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5 th Cir. 1962).
Despite the fact that the Williamson case \Vas overruled in terms of "per sc
to the criminal J·usticc svstcm
that
exclusion" , the Court in Williamson stressed the danucr
b
•
exist with the use of paid informants. The Court specifically stated as follows:
We, and other courts as well, have consistently held that the government is
not precluded from using informants before or during trial simply because
an informant may have a motive to falsify testimony or to entrap innocent
persons. Indeed, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue in/ Joff'a v. l}nited
States, 385 U.S. 293 ( 1966), and resolved it against Cucllar's position
here. While the Chief J usticc in dissent would have foreclosed
prosecution based on what he thought was a particularly unsavory use of
an informant, the majority held that regardless of the fact that Hoffa's
infonnant may have had more of a motive to lie than most, it docs not
follow that his testimony was untrue, not does it follow that his testimony
was constitutionally inadmissible. The established safeguards of he
Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested
by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined
by a properly instructed jury. At the trial of this case, [the infonnant] was
subject to rigorous cross-examination, and the extent and nature of his
dealings with federal and state authorities were insistently explored. The
trial judge instructed the jury, both specifically and generally with regard
to assessing [the informant's] credibility. The Constitution docs not
require us to upset the jury's verdict.
The important point here is that the Cuellar case indicates that the informant's
testimony was constitutionally admissible and as long as the veracity of the witness was
tested by cross-examination and the credibili(v of the testimony was determined b_v proper
instructions to the jrny. [ emphasis added.]

In the principal case, no such instruction was given despite its request by the
defense. Therefore, Lemmons' right to due process was violated.
In addition, it is worth noting that neither the State nor Lemmons requested the
lesser included offense of Delivery. (Trial Tr. p. 38 L LI. 13-24.) In a traditional
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trafficking case, the delivery and representation as to quantity occur at the same time. In
those types of cases. where the quantity of drugs delivered is 28 grams or more, there is
no need to determine whether or not a delivery and a representation have been made.
Unlike the traditional trafficking cases, this case involved a form of trafficking that
apparently had not been contemplated by the Idaho Jury Instructions. Therefore,
Lemmons believes that the jury instructions were correct, however, neither the State nor
Lemmons requested Delivery as a lesser included offense and, as such, the Court should
be barred from considering Delivery to be a lesser included offense. State v. Anderson.
82 Idaho 293, 3 52 P .2d 972 ( 1960).
To sum up this particular issue, the Court's refusal to give the Informant
Instruction requested by Lemmons is fundamental error as it violated Lemmons' right to
due process and Lemmons is entitled to a new trial on the charge(s) of Delivery.
The second issue supporting Lemmons' Motion for Retrial on Delivery charge(s)
is a little more sensitive and involves the fact that the State, in its closing argument,
indicated to the jury a fact not in evidence, i.e., indicated that his witness had represented
that an ounce was ·'more than 28 grams" when, in fact, the witness had only indicated that
an ounce was "approximately 28 grams". This was a clear misrepresentation of the
evidence in the case and clearly amounted to an improper closing argument by the
Prosecuting Attorney.
The fact is there is no rule of trial practice more universally accepted and applied
than the rule that counsel may not introduce into his argument to the jury statements
unsupported by evidence produced on the trial and made not as expressions of belief or
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proof~ but as assertions of fact. State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455, In Re: Care
and Treatment ofOntiberos, 295 Kan. 10,287 P.3d 855 (2012).

Further, in State v. Garcia, I 00 Idaho l 08, 594 P.2d 146 ( 1979), it was held that
improper closing argument by the prosecuting attorney constituted "fundamental error"
and was therefore reviewable on appeal notwithstanding the fact that no objection had
been made by defense counsel during the trial.
The fact is that in the principal case, objection was made to the jury by defense
counsel to the misstatements of the evidence by the State.
And, finally, although it is not Lemmons' belief or assertion that the State in this
case intentionalzv made these misrepresentations, it is noteworthy that the ABA Standards
on Criminal Justice look very unfavorably upon situations such as this. Consider the
following:

Standard 3-5.8 Argument to the Jury
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable
inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not
intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences
it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion
as to the truth of falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to
the prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would di\ert the
jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
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Standard 3-5.9 Facts Outside the Record
The prosecutor should not intentionally refer to or argue on the basis of facts
outside the record whether at trial or on appeal, unless such facts arc matters of
common public knowledge on ordinary human experience or matters of which the
court may take judicial notice.
Based on the above citations, and specifically State v. Garcia, it is Lemmons'
belief that the actions on the part of the State in misrepresenting facts not in evidence to
the jury, violated Lemmons' right to due process and demand a retrial on the charge of
Delivery, if not an acquittal.
Of course,·the relevant and critical issue here is whether the State's comments so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. Darden v. Waynewright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). In
applying the harmless error rule, the Idaho Courts have held that where the admissible
evidence provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, "overwhelming and conclusive" proof of
defendant's guilt, the admission of tainted evidence will be held to be harmless.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 78 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967).
However, in the principal case, the State's misrepresentations could hardly be
considered harmless error wherein that was the only source of evidence that one ounce
equals ''more than 28 grams" throughout the entire trial. In other words, that statement by
the State in its closing argument can be the only source from which the jury determined
that there were ''28 grams or more" of narcotics involved thereby completely eliminating
the possibility of the State's misstatements amounting to harmless error.
The State will, in all likelihood, try to bi forcate the effect on the jury of the State's
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comments, i.e., a misstatement of the evidence showing that there were "28 brrams or
more" that the State made to the jury only applied to the charge of Trafficking, and not
Delivery. Actually, that is not so. Consider the following case:
In (JS. v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court stated as
follows:
Prosccutorial Misconduct
Analysis of a claim of prosccutorial misconduct focuses on its asserted
impropriety and substantial prejudicial effect (sec, e.g .. United States v.
Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1539 (9th Cir. 1988)). We must therefore
determine at the outset whether the prosecutor made improper statements
during the course of the trial, after which we will tum to the effect of any
such misconduct.
As to the threshold issue of impropriety, we conclude that prosecutorial
misconduct was clearly involved, both ( 1) because the prosecutor vouched
for the credibility of witnesses and (2) because he also made arguments
designed to encourage the jury to convict in order to alleviate social
problems.

Where defense counsel objects at trial to acts of alleged prosccutorial
misconduct, we review for harmless error on defendant's appeal; absent
such an objection, we review under the more deferential plain error
standard.
Weatherspoon raised objections at trial to some but not all of the
statements that he now challenges as improper. Even so, he argues that a
harmless error analysis should be applied to the entirety of his appeal
because his failures to object were attributable to the district court's
demonstrated unwillingness to entertain his objections. But we need not
venture into that fray. because the misconduct at issue here requires
reversal even under the more restrictive plain error standard, under which
reversal is appropriate "only if the prosecutor's improper conduct so
affected the jury's ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that
it tainted the verdict and depri\·cd [Weatherspoon] of a fair trial" (Smith,
962 F.2d at 935). And to that end we must rcvie\v the potential for
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prejudicial effect in the context of the entire trial (Young, 470 U.S. at 16,
105 S.Ct. 1038).

Because of these hazards to a fair trial, case law has condemned both ( 1)
personal vouching by a prosecutor for the credibility of the government's
witnesses, and (2) the expression by a prosecutor of the prosecutor's
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, but only when remarks
either "say [or] insinuate that the statement was based on personal
knowledge or on anything other than the testimony of those witnesses
given before the jury." Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,359 n. 15, 78
S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958). To quote the old Fifth Circuit, "The test
as to whether the prosecutor has expressed an improper opinion is
'whether the prosecutor's expression might reasonably lead the jury to
believe that there is other evidence, unknown or unavailable to the jury, on
which the prosecutor' relied." United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 566
(5th Cir. 1975). Both practices tend to override the important role of jurors
in our system by drawing them away from their sworn duty to focus only
on the evidence in the record and the law.

Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a
reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise
fair proceeding. Instead, as Lawn teaches, the remarks must be examined
within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's
behavior amounted to prejudicial error.
[Emphasis added.]
In applying the above-cited law to our case, there is no question that the State
made improper statements to the jury in indicating to them that the State's witness had
testified that there were "more than 28 grams in an ounce" because the State's witness
never said that. That evidence, which \Vas not presented at trial, goes to the very clement
that was necessary to prove the charge, i.e., that there were "more than 28 grams" of
substance involved. So, that statement was improper.

As to the question as to whether it had any affect on the outcome of the verdict,
the matter simply speaks for itself. The place that evidence came from was from the State
during closing argument and it is obvious that it has affected the jury because it was a
unanimous verdict that there had been "more than 28 grams". Therefore, it is, ipsofczcto,
a tainted verdict.
Now comes the real ''kicker" in this case. It would appear from the above
citations, that Lemmons is at least entitled to a new trial on the charge(s) of Delivery.
However, Idaho Code Section 19-1719 indicates otherwise. Consider the following:
19-1719. CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL BARS INCLUDED
OFFENSES.
When the defendant is convicted or acquitted, or has once been placed in
jeopardy upon an indictment, the conviction, acquittal or jeopardy is a bar
to another indictment for the offense charged in the fonner, or for an
attempt to commit the same, or for an offense included therein, of which
he might have been convicted under that indictment.
The long and short of this is that since Delivery was a lesser included offense of
the charge of Trafficking, and Lemmons should be acquitted of the charge(s), because of
Evans and other cited cases, Lemmons cannot be retried for Delivery. Putting it another

way, the acquittal on the Trafficking charge(s) amounts to resjudicata creating a situation
whereby the State is collaterally estopped from reprosecuting Lemmons. And, therefore,
not only is Lemmons entitled to an acquittal of the charge(s) of Trafficking and
Conspiracy to Traffic, she is also entitled to a dismissal of the Delivery charge(s) on the
basis ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel. !lard v. Burlingron, 87 F.2d 1454 (9 th Cir.
1989), Dardon v. Wayne,tright, 497 U.S. 168 ( 1986). Chaprnan , .. California. 386 U.S.

- ,.;..). ')

18 (1967). Also, see State v. Byington, 139 Idaho 516, 81 P.3d 421 (2003) \vherein the
Court states as follows:
Where a defendant has sought and obtained reversal of a conviction on
grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy
principles do not prevent a second trial. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323
(1970); State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317,321 n. 2,859 P.2d 353,357 n. 2
(Ct.App. 1993). Byington's specific circumstance, where a prior conviction
was reversed due to the failure of the charging document to allege all the
clements of the offense, was addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896 ). In that case, three
defendants were charged with murder. At a jury trial, two defendants were
found guilty and the third was acquitted. On the appeal of the convicted
defendants, the Supreme Court held that the indictment by which they
were charged was fatally defective for failing to allege either the time or
place of the victim's death, and the Court therefore reversed the judgments
of conviction. Another indictment was then obtained against all three
defendants, each of whom raised a plea of former jeopardy. Those pleas
were overruled by the trial court, and the three defendants were tried and
found guilty. The matter was again appealed to the Supreme Court. As to
the defendant who had been acquitted in the first trial, the Court held that
the verdict of acquittal was a bar to a second indictment for the same
killing, notwithstanding the jurisdictional flaw in the indictment. As to the
other two defendants, however, the Court held that a second prosecution
was permissible. The Court stated, "[I]t is quite clear that a defendant who
procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside may be
tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the
same offense of which he had been convicted." Id. at 672. In Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981 ), the Supreme Court explained the rationale
for the principle that a reversal of a conviction on grounds other than
insufficiency of the evidence does not prevent reprosecution: "This rule
rests on the premise that the original conviction has been nullified and 'the
slate wiped clean."' Id. at 442 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721). It is thus
apparent that the Fifth Amendment presents no bar to Byington's second
prosecution.
[emphasis added.]
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Lemmons requests that the State's appeal be dismissed and that
they take nothing thereby. Lemmons also requests that she be granted an acquittal as to
the two counts of Delivery of Methamphetarnines. In the alternative, Lemmons requests
that she be granted a new trial as to the two counts of Delivery of Methamphctamines.
DA TED This 15 th day of April 2014 ..
FULLER LAW OFFICES

Attorney for Cross-Appellant
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